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PROCEDURAL UNFAIR WAGE DIFFERENTIALS AND THEIR EFFECTS
ON UNETHICAL BEHAVIOR
KERSTIN GROSCH and HOLGER A. RAU∗
In this paper, we investigate how payment procedures that are deemed unfair can
spur unethical behavior towards innocent coworkers in a real-effort experiment. In our
Discrimination treatment, a highly unfair payment procedure with wage differentials,
half the workforce is randomly selected and paid by relative performance whereas the
remaining receives no payment. A joy-of-destruction game measures unethical behavior
subsequently. Non-earners inDiscrimination destroy significantly more than in the non-
discriminatory control treatments. In Discrimination, unethical behavior is generally
high for all non-earners, independent of individual inequality aversion and relative
performance beliefs. In the control treatments, inequality aversion is the main driver
of destructive behavior. (JEL C91, D03, J33, J70, M52)
I. INTRODUCTION
Ethical behavior is crucial for sustaining coop-
erative behavior and to promote the success-
ful functioning of institutions (Shleifer 2004).
Knowing that people violate social norms can
stifle interactions and impede cooperation. A
manifestation of unethical behavior is antisocial
behavior, which generates efficiency losses and
may arise as a consequence of frustration. In
the company setting, empirical evidence reports
that U.S. firms lose about $50 billion each year
because of white-collar crime, i.e., fraud and theft
(Coffin 2003).1 It is possible that these costs do
not only reflect direct revenge against the com-
pany or workers’ antisocial actions for ownmate-
rial benefit. It is plausible that firm losses also
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1. Similarly, Disselkamp (2004) reports that German
firms bear costs of €50 billion because of inner dismissals,
conflicts in the workplace, and high drop-out rates reflected
in the number of staff on sick leave.
arise because frustrated workers may indirectly
affect the company’s efficiency when they lash
out on innocent coworkers. In this paper, we
investigate these spillover effects of procedural
unfairness in one domain, i.e., differential pay-
ment at the workplace, on antisocial behavior in
another domain, i.e., unethical actions towards
innocent coworkers.
Procedural fairness is an important pre-
dictor for organizational outcomes (McFarlin
and Sweeney 1992). The concept refers to
the way authorities allocate resources and can
be described as people’s degree of fairness
perception of deployed procedures (Tyler and
Lind 2002). Perfect procedural fairness is defined
by an independent criterion for what constitutes
a fair outcome of the procedure. The procedure
must guarantee that a fair result will be achieved
(Rawls 2009). In contrast, distributional fairness
concerns the fairness perception of the amount
of compensation.
At the workplace, differential payments are
often claimed to be based on merit, that is, a
higher performance leads to higher remuner-
ation. However, it is likely that the allocation
procedure of bonuses is not based on perfor-
mance one-to-one since not all work processes
can be impeccably monitored and part of the
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workforce may not be considered for a bonus
payment (French, Kubo, and Marsden 2000).
There is substantial evidence demonstrating that
the source of wage differentials, for example,
discriminatory or non-discriminatory payment
procedures, determines workers’ fairness percep-
tions and acceptance of payments (e.g., Alesina
and Angeletos 2005; Durante, Putterman, and
Van der Weele 2014; Ku and Salmon 2013).
As a consequence, unfair wage differentials
may serve as a so-called frustrator resulting
in dissatisfaction and resentment (Giacalone
and Greenberg 1997). Survey data from the UK
corroborates this idea, showing that more than
one-third of financial professionals believe that
bonuses given to topmanagers are unjustified and
cause resentment in the office (CIMA 2016). In
this study, we examine this nexus in the lab. We
investigate spillover effects from a discrimina-
tory payment regime with unjustified payments
on antisocial behavior against innocent other
workers. The term discrimination is often used
when certain groups of people do not receive
equal chances (e.g., for a bonus) on certain
grounds such as race, gender, or age. In this
paper, we take beliefs of discriminating reasons
out of the picture and refer to the definition
of Collin’s English Dictionary which says that
discrimination “[… ] is the practice of treating
one person or group of people less fairly or
less well than other people or groups” (Collins
Online English Dictionary 2019). We expect
to find increased antisocial behavior when the
payment procedure is discriminatory. There are
several channels that may explain this effect.
First, people may feel frustrated when being
discriminated against by a remuneration scheme.
Hence, they need to release their negative emo-
tions and vent them on other persons such as
coworkers (Card and Dahl 2011; Munyo and
Rossi 2013). Second, the allocation procedure
may be categorized as an unethical action itself
that is not aligned with social norms. Being
treated unethically by a discriminatory payment
regime may make people acting unethically
themselves in turn. This is prompted by a study
of Gino, Ayal, and Ariely (2009) who find that
unethical behavior can be contagious and people
are affected by the degree of unethical acts
around them.
To investigate the link between discrimina-
tory payment regimes and unethical behavior,
we conduct a real-effort experiment. We use a
subtle mode of discrimination in which half of
the workforce take part in a competition for
bonuses whereas the performance of the other
half of the workforce is not taken into account
for calculating payments. We vary the procedures
of payment regimes. Subsequently, we measure
workers’ engagement in antisocial actions. In the
Discrimination treatment, half the participants
are randomly selected and receive a zero pay-
ment (“non-earners”). The rest is promoted and
competes for bonuses (“earners”). In this group,
relative performance determines payments, that
is, the 50% best-performing subjects receive €15
whereas the 50% least-performing subjects of
this group earn €5.2 By contrast, in the first
control treatment (Competition) all payments are
performance-based and there is no discrimina-
tion in terms of payment. Here, all workers par-
ticipate in a competition for bonuses. The com-
petitive payment regime is characterized by the
transparency of payments in accordance with the
subjects’ relative performance. That is, work-
ers receive information on their relative perfor-
mance by the level of the bonus pay they earn.
In a second control treatment (Random), there
is not a competition for bonuses as all pay-
ments are randomly allocated to workers. Our
outcome variable is subjects’ antisocial behav-
ior in a “joy-of-destruction (JoD)” game (Abbink
and Herrmann 2011; Abbink and Sadrieh 2009).
Here, a non-earner is paired with an earner and
both decide how many canteen vouchers of their
paired player they want to destroy. We are aware
that the JoD game is a stylized setting to mea-
sure antisocial behavior at the workplace. Nev-
ertheless, we believe that it is appropriate, as
it enables us to measure antisocial behavior in
a controlled way, which is hardly possible in
the field. Although many workplace actions such
as fraud and theft may be motivated by self-
interest, it is plausible that this behavior may
also arise as a consequence of workplace frustra-
tion due to discrimination by a payment regime.
In this paper, we focus on this aspect and mea-
sure workers’ antisocial behavior in a JoD game
when being discriminated by a payment regime.
Afterward, we implement a sequential prisoner’s
dilemma game to test whether a discriminatory
payment regime dampens prosocial behavior as
well (Buser and Dreber 2015; Grosch, Ibanez,
and Viceisza 2017).
2. We deliberately decided not to create an
employer–worker situation and we never inform sub-
jects on their exact performance. This is because acts of
discrimination can often neither be attributed to a single
manager nor do workers know that they had deserved a bonus
based on relative performance without any doubt.
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JoD experiments find that people enjoy
harming others even when these antisocial
actions do not increase own monetary ben-
efits (Abbink and Herrmann 2011; Abbink
and Sadrieh 2009). Some studies suggest that
inequality-aversion motives drive subjects’
destruction levels (Fehr 2018; Zizzo 2003; Zizzo
and Oswald 2001). Motivated by this evidence,
we elicit inequality aversion (Blanco, Engel-
mann, and Normann 2011) before the crux of the
experiment to scrutinize the explanatory power of
these individual preferences. We hold wage dif-
ferentials constant among payment groups across
treatments to be able to differentiate between the
effects of individual levels of inequality aversion
and different payment regimes.
We find that, generally, non-earners destroy
a larger fraction of vouchers than earners.
Unethical behavior is more pronounced in the
Discrimination treatment than in the control
treatments. Inequality aversion only has explana-
tory power for non-discriminatory payment
regimes but cannot explain the high destruction
in the Discrimination treatment. The results
suggest that workers in Discrimination are
generally fed up by the procedural unfairness
of the payment regime independent of their
perception of relative performance. The find-
ings in the sequential-prisoner’s dilemma show
that a discriminatory payment regime impairs
cooperative behavior.
Theoretical work argues that unethical behav-
ior is the result of situational and personal fac-
tors (Hunt and Vitell 1986; Trevino 1986). Our
study makes several contributions to the related
literature. First, we contribute to the literature
on personal factors influencing unethical behav-
ior. There is evidence that high social class and
individual social preferences make people more
likely to break the law, steal, and cheat (Grosch
and Rau 2017; Piff et al. 2012). We add to this
literature and identify individual inequality aver-
sion as a driver of unethical behavior when pay-
ment regimes are transparent.
Second, we contribute to the evidence on
situational factors that determine the behav-
ioral environment. A competitive environment,
for example, can bring out unethical behavior
such as child labor to prevail in the compet-
itive market (Graafland 2010; Shleifer 2004).
Moreover, the social environment and peers’
behavior influence own ethical conduct (Gino,
Ayal, and Ariely 2009; Zey-Ferrell and Fer-
rell 1982). Another example for a situational
factor is (perceived) unfair procedures in an
institution that can trigger retaliation behavior
of employees. Several experimental studies
have shown that the procedure accountable
for a payment distribution affects subjects’
redistribution decisions reflecting fairness
perceptions of the applied procedures (e.g.,
Akbas¸, Ariely, and Yuksel 2019; Blount 1995;
Bolton, Brandts, and Ockenfels 2005; Cap-
pelen et al. 2007, 2013; Konow 2000). When
institutions violate procedural-fairness norms,
people may refuse to accept unequal outcomes
(Grimalda, Kar, and Proto 2016), may engage in
cheating (Gill, Prowse, and Vlassopoulos 2013),
lying (Banerjee, Gupta, and Villeval 2018), sab-
otage (Ambrose, Seabright, and Schminke 2002;
Fehr 2018), or theft (Greenberg 1990) in retri-
bution. Moreover, procedural unfairness at the
workplace can lower workers’ intrinsic motiva-
tion (e.g., Breza, Kaur, and Shamdasani 2018;
Cohn et al. 2014; Gächter and Thöni 2010; Heinz
et al. Forthcoming), work satisfaction (Breza,
Kaur, and Shamdasani 2018), and labor supply
(Bracha, Gneezy, and Loewenstein 2015). In
contrast to the aforementioned studies, we do
not focus on antisocial behavior as a retribu-
tive justice motive, or on situations in which
it is individually beneficial to act unethically.
Instead, we focus on the consequences of a
discriminatory payment scheme, characterized
by unequal chances of promotion, on antiso-
cial behavior towards innocent coworkers. In
our scenario, coworkers are not responsible for
experiencing unfair treatment. Whereas other
studies look at positive spillover effects from
an institution to prosocial behavior (e.g., Engl,
Riedl, and Weber 2018; Galbiati, Henry, and
Jacquemet 2018), we provide evidence on neg-
ative spillover effects from unfair procedures
in one domain on unethical conduct in another
domain. These side effects can provide impor-
tant insights that should be factored in when
evaluating the efficiency of payment institutions.
II. EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN
A. Experimental Framework
The experiment consists of a short presurvey,
the main part, and an expost questionnaire. The
sequence of actions is illustrated in Figure 1.
After a brief questionnaire, we elicit the
inequality-aversion parameters of the Fehr
and Schmidt (1999) model with the method
introduced by Blanco, Engelmann, and Nor-
mann (2011) (Stage 1). For two-player games, a
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FIGURE 1
Experimental Sequence
Fehr and Schmidt (1999) function is given by:
Ui(xi, xj) =
{
xi − αi(xj − xi) if xi ≤ xj
xi − βi(xi − xj) if xi > xj,
where xi and xj, i≠ j denote the monetary pay-
offs of the two players. The model implies that
a subject’s utility decreases by disadvantageous
inequality (i.e., when subject i has a lower income
than subject j) and it decreases by advanta-
geous inequality (i.e., when subject i has a higher
income than subject j). The degree of utility
loss from a situation characterized by disadvan-
tageous inequality is captured by the parameter
𝛼 (envy parameter) whereas 𝛽 (guilt parameter)
captures the utility loss in a situation character-
ized by advantageous inequality aversion.
The method of Blanco, Engelmann, and
Normann (2011) elicits these two parameters.
The method is based on choice sets with varying
money allocations between oneself and another
participant. Participants then have to decide
for their preferred allocations using the strat-
egy method. Based on their decisions alpha,
that is, the aversion towards disadvantageous
inequality and beta, that is, the aversion towards
advantageous inequality, can be calculated. The
aversion parameters alpha and beta increase
in magnitude the more pronounced subject’s
inequality aversion is. We keep this procedure
constant across treatments. To rule out spillover
effects, we do not inform subjects of the outcome
in these games before the main experiment was
finished. The details of Blanco, Engelmann, and
Normann’s (2011) elicitation mechanism can be
found in the Appendix (Supporting information).
We summarize the subsequent stages and the
ex-post survey in the following.
Stage 2: Real-Effort Task. In this stage, sub-
jects work in a real-effort task in which we vary
the payment regime exogenously. The 8-minute
task involves counting zeros individually in 5× 9
matrices, consisting of random numbers of zeros
and ones. After completion of the task, half the
participants are assigned to the group of “earners”
TABLE 1
Summary of Treatments
Treatment Non-discriminatory
All Workers are Paid
Performance-Based
(Merit Pay)
Discrimination x x
Competition ✓ ✓
Random ✓ x
and the remaining half is assigned to the group of
“non-earners.” Earners receive €15 or €5 whereas
non-earners receive €0.We keep the payment dis-
tribution constant among participants: 50% of the
workforce receive €0, 25% earn €5, and 25% earn
€15. In the three treatments, we vary how pay-
ments are allocated to participants.
Across treatments, we switch two deter-
minants on and off: (1) discrimination in the
opportunity to receive a bonus and whether (2)
all workers are paid performance-based. First,
“discrimination” can be defined as treating a par-
ticular group of people differently, for example,
withdrawing equal opportunities such as partici-
pation in a competition for bonuses. Second, we
refer to a payment scheme that is “performance-
based” when all payments depend on relative
performance. Hence, in a performance-based
payment procedure, better-performing work-
ers receive at least as much of a payoff as
an equivalent-performing worker per design.
Table 1 illustrates which determinants matter
within the different treatments. We elaborate on
the design details of theDiscrimination treatment
and the two non-discriminatory treatments in the
following paragraphs.
In Discrimination, we create a payment
regime with neither equal opportunities nor
correct treatment for all workers. Participants are
randomly assigned to either the group of non-
earners or the group of earners. The performance
of non-earners is ignored when determining the
payoffs and, therefore, they are discriminated
against. In contrast, participants within the group
of earners are ranked based on their total num-
ber of correctly solved matrices. The workers
ranked in the upper half of the distribution
receive €15 and those ranked in the lower half
receive €5.
In contrast, in the Competition treatment, all
participants are treated equally and the remuner-
ation is performance-based. In this treatment, a
performance ranking among all participants is
executed. The ranking determines the assignment
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to the group of non-earners and earners and the
respective payments. Participants who rank in the
first quartile of the distribution earn €15, partici-
pants who rank in the second quartile of the dis-
tribution earn €5. They are assigned to the group
of earners.Workers who rank in either the third or
fourth quartile receive nothing and are assigned to
the group of non-earners. Hence, there is no room
for discrimination, as all payments are always a
direct consequence of relative performance.
We run another control treatment called Ran-
dom. Here, not only the assignment to the group
of earners and non-earners is imposed randomly
but we also cut off competition within the earner
group and distribute bonuses completely ran-
domly. As a consequence, all workers are paid
independent of their relative performance. Since
all workers still have an equal chance of receiving
a bonus, the payment regime can be called non-
discriminatory. However, no worker is treated by
the performance-based scheme, as the random
payment mechanism ignores workers’ individ-
ual performance. The treatment comparison of
workers who did not work under a performance-
based scheme such as Random and Discrimina-
tion enables us to disentangle the effects of dis-
crimination from being treated differently.
Subjects are informed about the payment pro-
cedures before they work on the task. We apply
this feature as it is more realistic than informing
subjects on the payment regime after they have
worked. We made use of a neutral framing and
called earners “participant A” and non-earners
“participant B.”3
Stage 3: JoD Game. Wemodify the JoD game by
Abbink and Sadrieh (2009). In the beginning, all
participants are virtually endowed with six can-
teen vouchers each.4 A non-earner is matched
with an earner. Each participant (non-earner and
earner), then, simultaneously decides on how
many vouchers between 0 and 6 s/he wants to
3. For example, participants received the following infor-
mation in the random treatment: “After completion of the
task, the computer will randomly select 12 participants (out
of 24). The 12 selected participants will be called participant
As. They will be rewarded independent of the number of tasks
they solved correctly. The other 12 participants are called par-
ticipant Bs and do not receive a reward for this task. The
payoffs for participant As are distributed based on a random
ranking generated by the computer. The ranking is indepen-
dent of the number of tasks solved correctly”.
4. Students at the university hold a student identity card.
This ID card is used to pay for meals at the university’s
canteen and can be topped up with credit. With one of our
vouchers participants could top up their credit by €1.
destroy from the matched participant.5 Decisions
are entered on a computer screen and destruc-
tion is free of cost. We also implement a ran-
dom parameter that destroys vouchers with a
50% probability. In this case, the computer ran-
domly destroys 0–6 vouchers. When the com-
puter’s choice is implemented, all levels from 0
to 6 are equally likely. In the other 50% of the
cases, the participant’s decision determines the
number of vouchers destroyed. The implemen-
tation of the random parameter reduces moral
costs since mean actions can be hidden under
the guise of a possible random event (Abbink
and Herrmann 2011). In real life, in many cases,
antisocial actions such as stealing from bullying
coworkers cannot be traced back to one partic-
ular person, and mean actions can be hidden as
well. Information about the number of devalued
vouchers is only revealed at the very end of the
experimental session.
Participants receive information about the ran-
dom parameter and its likelihood to destroy. They
only learn about which decision, their or the deci-
sion of the random parameter, had been imple-
mented at the very end of a session. Before non-
earners decide in the JoD game, they are informed
about the matched partner’s exact payment (€5
or €15) of the real-effort stage. Similarly, earn-
ers learn that they are matched with a non-earner.
The JoD game is played one shot.
Stage 4: Cooperative Behavior. We use a
sequential-move prisoner’s dilemma (Blanco
et al. 2014) to measure the spillover effects of
unfair payment regimes on antisocial behavior
and cooperation. All participants (independent of
their earnings) are matched in dyads and receive
no information about the matched partner. The
first mover makes a binary decision and chooses
to cooperate or to defect. Similarly, the second
mover responds with either cooperation or defec-
tion. When the first mover defects, the decision
of the second mover becomes irrelevant and both
receive a payoff of 10 tokens. If both cooperate,
they receive 14 tokens each. If the first mover
cooperates and the second mover defects, the
first mover earns 7 tokens and the second mover
earns 17 tokens (for a game-tree illustration
see experimental instructions in the Appendix,
Supporting information). In this game, we apply
the strategy method. To determine the payments,
5. We used a more neutral framing in the experimental
instructions and applied the wording “you can remove vouch-
ers.” Subjects know that destroyed vouchers would become
useless for both subjects.
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one participant in each dyad is randomly selected
into the role of the first mover and the other
participant is selected into the role of the sec-
ond mover. We apply an exchange rate of 1
token = €0.20. The sequential-move prisoner’s
dilemma is played one shot.
Questionnaires. At the very beginning of the
session, participants fill out a short presurvey
in which we collect baseline measures on sub-
jects’ mood and risk preferences. For this pur-
pose, we ask subjects about their willingness
to take risks on a scale between 1 (not pre-
pared to take risks) and 10 (fully prepared to
take risks) (Dohmen et al. 2012). After the exper-
imental session, participants are asked about their
fairness perceptions of the payment regime and
additional questions. Moreover, we capture per-
sonality traits using the BIG-5 query (Costa and
McCrae 1989).6 Finally, sociodemographic fea-
tures such as age and study program are recorded.
Information Revelation. Subjects are only
informed about their earnings at the very end
of the experiment to avoid confounding effects
from stage to stage. The only exception is the
real-effort task. After being exposed to the treat-
ment stage, we directly hand out envelopes and
enclose a card on group affiliation, A (earners)
or B (non-earners), and the respective banknotes
(if any) they earned in this stage. Since our
interest is to capture subjects’ fairness percep-
tion of a payment regime, it was necessary to
inform subjects about their payment in this
stage. However, we neither inform participants
explicitly about their absolute performance
in the real-effort task nor about their relative
performance to the other participants in the
group to avoid another level of heterogeneity
across the different groups we want to com-
pare. Subjects were informed whether their
destruction decision or the computer’s decision
became relevant at the very end of the session.
B. Experimental Procedures
We collected the experimental data from June
to August 2016. In total, 252 students from
the University of Göttingen took part in 13
6. We do not report the BIG-5 results on antisocial behav-
ior in the paper. However, we find that more pronounced neu-
roticism leads to more destructive behavior whereas higher
levels of agreeableness and conscientiousness lead to signif-
icantly less destruction in the JoD game. These personality
effects are in line with findings from empirical studies (e.g.,
Jones, Miller, and Lynam 2011).
sessions. In each session, we had 16–24 par-
ticipants. The experiment was programmed and
conducted in z-Tree (Fischbacher 2007). Sub-
jects from various fields of study were recruited
with ORSEE (Greiner 2015). The sessions lasted
approximately 90minutes and subjects earned
€17 (ca. $18.90) on average.
C. Hypotheses
We expect that, in general, non-earners
destroy more than earners, as they lag behind
the incomes of earners. It has been shown that
people who have relatively less money than
others burn money of the better-off to equalize
payoffs (e.g., Fehr 2018; Zizzo 2003, 2004).
Since this phenomenon has been demonstrated
in different contexts and seems to be robust, we
expect that low earners destroy more than high
earners across treatments in our set-up, too.
The treatment differences should depend on
the nature of the payment procedures that we
test in different settings. Procedures are perceived
as unfair when conditions are considered dis-
advantageous for a group or when the proce-
dure violates an existing moral tenet (Folger and
Cropanzano 2001). Since the non-earners in the
Discrimination treatment are left out of the com-
petition for bonuses, they could be seen as being
disadvantaged by the payment regime. Unethi-
cal behavior can also be a response to perceived
procedural unfairness. First, the act of an institu-
tion of being procedural unfair can be categorized
by people as an unethical action in itself which
justifies being unethical oneself (Gino, Ayal, and
Ariely 2009). Furthermore, workers may become
frustrated and relieve their negative emotions
in an unethical act harming an innocent other
person (Giacalone and Greenberg 1997; Neu-
man 2004). Based on relative deprivation theory
(Davis 1959), people in a deprived group might
compare their payoff relative to peoples’ payoff
in another privileged group. Transferred to our
experiment, in the Discrimination treatment, we
should find that non-earners may compare them-
selves to earners and may feel deprived since
they are not paid as the other half of the work-
force what they may deem as procedurally unfair.
Hence, we expect that subjects’ unfairness per-
ception is particularly pronounced in the Dis-
crimination treatment, as subjects do not know
whether being not paid was justified by perfor-
mance. In contrast, non-earners in the Compe-
tition treatment know that their relatively poor
performance is the reason for their zero payment.
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As there is no competition at all in Random,
non-earners cannot feel deprived of the right to
take part in a competition. Therefore, frustration
should be lower and non-earners should become
more antisocial under a discriminatory than under
a random payment regime. This way, non-earners
may be more accepting and less frustrated in the
control treatments compared to non-earners in the
Discrimination treatment (Bracha, Gneezy, and
Loewenstein 2015). We summarize these trains
of thought in the first two hypotheses.
Hypothesis 1: Destructive behavior of
non-earners
a. Non-earners destroy significantly more
vouchers than earners.
b. Non-earners in the Discrimination treat-
ment destroy significantly more vouchers than
non-earners in the Competition and Random
treatments.
We strive to shed light on the mechanisms,
too. Part of the explanation for non-earners’
destructive behavior may be individual inequality
aversion. Experiments studying antisocial behav-
ior report that subjects burn money to equalize
incomes (e.g., Fehr 2018; Zizzo 2003, 2004).
The real-effort framework is characterized
by wage differentials, which lead to income
inequality between earners and non-earners.
Non-earners’ utility loss may increase with an
increasing level of disliking disadvantageous
inequality (e.g., Card et al. 2012; Fehr and
Schmidt 1999). Hence, particularly inequality-
averse non-earners may try to level the playing
field with earners by burning vouchers. It follows
that the amount of destroyed vouchers depends
on non-earners’ level of aversion towards
disadvantageous inequality.
Hypothesis 2: The destruction level depends on
the degree of non-earners’ aversion towards dis-
advantageous inequality.
Another mechanism at play may be the
incorrect treatment by the payment regime,
that is, earning less than deserved by relative
performance. In the Competition treatment, all
participants are paid based on their relative
performance. In contrast, in the Discrimination
treatment there may be subjects in the earner
group, particularly among the ones earning €5,
with relatively poor performance compared to all
participants in the session. Even subjects earning
€15 may have lower performance than some of
the subjects in the non-earner group. In Random,
in which payments are completely random,
there are paid subjects who did not deserve their
payments, as their relative performance may be
lower than the performance of non-earners. The
likelihood to belong to the earner group with
relatively low performance is highest in Discrim-
ination and lowest in Competition. Knowing that
there is a chance that the matched participant
does not deserve his/her payment by relative per-
formance level and that not everybody is treated
equally, may make non-earners to perceive the
payment procedure of Discrimination as less
procedurally fair. Particularly non-earners who
think that they were discriminated against, that
is, workers who hold the belief that they deserved
a payment by performance, may feel entitled to
take part in the competition for bonuses (Clark
and Oswald 1996; Crosby 1976; Gurr 1970).
This feeling of entitlement may make these sub-
jects more frustrated and antisocial than subjects
who did not hold this belief.
Hypothesis 3: Workers who believe that they
were discriminated against by the payment
regime destroy more than workers who do not
hold this belief .
Cooperative behavior, which can be seen as
the flipside of antisocial behavior, is essential for
well-functioning institutions. It has been shown
that the origin of endowments may matter for
cooperative behavior (e.g., Kroll, Cherry, and
Shogren 2007). In our set-up, the real-effort task
precedes the cooperation game and does not
determine endowments for the cooperation game.
However, the level of the unfairness of a payment
procedure may moderate beliefs about other peo-
ple’s cooperativeness (e.g., Kocher et al. 2015).
Moreover, the unfair proceduremay threaten peo-
ple’s needs for control, certainty, and belong-
ing (De Cremer and Tyler 2005). When there is
a lack of perceived belonging and identification
within groups, cooperation can decrease (e.g.,
Tyler and Blader 2001). As a consequence, we
expect that cooperation decreases under a dis-
criminatory payment scheme in which there may
be a lack of identification with the coworkers due
to the unfair payment procedure.
Hypothesis 4: Workers are less coopera-
tive under a discriminatory payment regime
compared to workers under non-discriminatory
payment regimes.
III. RESULTS
This section first focuses on subjects’ perfor-
mance to justify discrimination and we compare
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FIGURE 2
Subjects’ Performance within Payment Groups
with Standard Errors in Parentheses
effort levels and respective payments across
treatments. Then, we will focus on our main
outcome variable, that is, destructive behavior in
the JoD game. Afterward, we pin down potential
mechanisms and examine the role of inequality
aversion and performance beliefs. Finally, we
examine whether a discriminatory payment
procedure also dampens cooperative behavior.
When applying nonparametric tests we always
report two-sided p values throughout.
A. Main Results
We start to report subjects’ performance con-
ditioned on the earnings they received. This way,
we can verify whether non-earners were discrim-
inated against and received no payment unjusti-
fiably in the Discrimination treatment. Figure 2
displays an overview of subjects’ performance in
the three treatments.
The performance distributions across pay-
ment groups are as expected and we describe
them in the following. In the Competition
treatment, participants are paid based on perfor-
mance. As a consequence, subjects’ performance
monotonically increases in their payment level.
On average, earners solved 12 grids more
than non-earners in the Competition treatment
(Mann–Whitney test, p< 0.001). This distribu-
tion results from obvious sorting by design. By
contrast, in Discrimination, non-earners achieve
a significantly higher performance (30.65) than
subjects who received a €5 payment (23.85)
(Mann–Whitney test, p = 0.003) and than non-
earners in the Competition treatment (24.60)
(Mann–Whitney test, p = 0.001). This suggests
that a substantial fraction of non-earners were not
paid based on performance in Discrimination.
This is resulting from the design and as expected
some hard workers are assigned to the non-
earner group in the Discrimination treatment.
In Random, we find no significant performance
FIGURE 3
Destruction Levels of Non-earners and Earners
(Standard Deviations in Parentheses)
difference between any of the earner groups
(all Mann–Whitney tests are at least p> 0.514).
This is because different performance types are
uniformly distributed across payment groups.
Interestingly, subjects achieve a relatively high
performance although the payment is not linked
to performance. This is in line with the findings
of Benndorf, Rau, and Sölch (2019). An expla-
nation may be that subjects are bored and face
low effort costs.
We turn to subjects’ antisocial behavior, that
is, the average number of destroyed vouchers
across treatments. Figure 3 displays the average
level of destroyed vouchers across treatments
and earner groups (non-earners: white bars, €5
earners: gray bars, €15 earners: black bars). The
standard deviations are presented in parenthe-
ses. More detailed descriptives can be found
in Table S2 (Supporting information). On aver-
age, the destruction level of non-earners (1.33)
is significantly higher as compared to earners
(0.76) (Mann–Whitney test, p = 0.050) confirm-
ing Hypothesis 1a.
The difference is particularly pronounced
in Discrimination where non-earners destroy
significantly more vouchers (1.80) than
€5 earners (0.70) (Mann–Whitney test,
p = 0.033) and €15 earners (Mann–Whitney
test, p = 0.045). The difference is less pro-
nounced in the non-discriminatory Competition
treatment where non-earners (1.27) destroy
insignificantly more than €5 earners (0.42)
(Mann–Whitney test, p = 0.201) and €15 earn-
ers (0.75) (Mann–Whitney test, p = 0.430).
In Random where the payment regime is also
non-discriminatory, we find no significant
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TABLE 2
Ordered Logit Regressions on Destruction Levels of Non-earners Versus Earners
Destruction Level
All Workers Non-Earners
(1) (2) (3)
Discrimination× non-earner 1.187**
(0.599)
Discrimination× €5 earner −0.369
(0.793)
Competition× non-earner 0.384
(0.628)
Competition× €5 earner −0.221
(0.726)
Competition× €15 earner 0.281
(0.713)
Random× non-earner 0.154
(0.660)
Random× €5 earner 0.102
(0.731)
Random× €15 earner 0.768
(0.703)
Performance −0.011 0.006 0.000
(0.018) (0.023) (0.037)
Discrimination×matched with €5 1.287* 1.533*
(0.685) (0.883)
Discrimination×matched with €15 1.416** 1.702*
(0.684) (0.878)
Random×matched with €5 0.267 −0.092
(0.740) (1.034)
Random×matched with €15 0.657 1.277
(0.722) (0.884)
Competition×matched with €15 1.104* 1.431*
(0.668) (0.791)
Alpha 0.203** 0.301*** 0.264*
(0.081) (0.108) (0.139)
Beta −0.769* −1.197* −0.984
(0.460) (0.641) (0.791)
Obs. 252 126 82
Pseudo R2 0.037 0.060 0.078
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. *p< 0.1; **p< 0.05; ***p< 0.01.
difference between the destruction levels of
non-earners and earners (Mann–Whitney test,
p = 0.463) as well. The results are robust when
focusing on destruction frequencies, that is,
in Discrimination, non-earners destroy signif-
icantly more often than both earner groups.
By contrast, these differences cannot be found
in Competition and Random.7 To summarize,
the results show that a discriminatory payment
7. In Discrimination, non-earners destroy significantly
more often (50%) than €5 earners (20%) (𝜒2(1) = 5.000;
p = 0.025) and €15 earners (25%) (𝜒2(1) = 3.429; p = 0.064).
In Competition, no significant differences can be observed
between the destruction frequencies of non-earners (31%)
and €5 earners (21%) (𝜒2(1) = 0.865, p = 0.352) and €15
earners (0.25%) (𝜒2(1) = 0.865, p = 0.582). The same holds
in Random where no significant differences can be observed
between the destruction frequencies of non-earners (29%) and
€5 earners (32%) (𝜒2(1) = 0.042, p = 0.838) and €15 earners
(42%) (𝜒2(1) = 0.987, p = 0.321).
regime fosters antisocial behavior of subjects
who receive no earnings under these unequal
opportunities. As a consequence, they destroy
more vouchers than earners. By contrast, this
effect does not occur in Competition and Ran-
dom. The findings are confirmed by ordered logit
regressions (see Table 2) which reveal significant
treatment differences when focusing on the
destruction-level differences of non-earners and
€5 and €15 earners.
Model 1 applies indicator variables in which
the first variable refers to the treatment and the
second variable to subjects’ payment level. Alpha
(Beta) controls for subjects’ aversion to disadvan-
tageous (advantageous) inequality. In model 1,
we omit €15 earners in the Discrimination
treatment. The first regression shows that only
the coefficient of Discrimination × non-earner
is positive and significant. This confirms that
non-earners in the discriminatory treatment
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destroy substantially more vouchers than €15
earners. A Wald test shows that the coefficient
of Discrimination × non-earner is significantly
higher than the coefficient of Discrimina-
tion × €5 earner (p = 0.018). This highlights
that non-earners in Discrimination also destroy
more than €5 earners. The difference in destruc-
tion levels of non-earners and earners becomes
insignificant in the Competition and Random
treatment. In model 2, we focus on the subsam-
ple of non-earners to test for treatment effects
across non-earners in our treatments.
We control for interaction effects of the treat-
ment and the payment level of the matched
earner. We interact indicator variables for the
treatments with the matched partner’s payment
level. We omit the case in which a non-earner
in the Competition treatment is matched with
a €5 earner. The model demonstrates that non-
earners in the Discrimination treatment destroy
more vouchers than non-earners in the Competi-
tion treatment.
Non-earners with relatively low performance
may generally differ in their antisocial behavior
as compared to subjects with a relatively high per-
formance.8 We control for subjects’ performance
(Performance) in all three regressions in Table 2,
but the coefficient of Performance is close to zero
and not significant in any of the regressions. To
further rule out that performance drives the treat-
ment effect, we focus on the subsample of non-
earners with a below/equal-median performance
in our three treatments (29 correctly solved puz-
zles) in model 3. The regression results of model
3 are similar to the results in model 2 demonstrat-
ing that the treatment effects are independent of
performance differences.
We conducted a second robustness check for
potential self-selection into the non-earner group
based on individual characteristics. Here, we
compare non-earners’ characteristics and their
effect on destruction levels across treatments.
The results are presented in Table S1 (Support-
ing information). We do not find significant
treatment differences between non-earners’ char-
acteristics such as alphas, betas, their SVO angle
(Kolmogorov–Smirnov tests, all nine pairwise
comparisons, p> 0.657), and gender (𝜒2 tests,
all three pairwise comparisons, p> 0.506). This
demonstrates that non-earners destroy higher
levels in the Discrimination treatment than in the
8. We thank an anonymous referee and Tim Salmon for
raising this issue.
other treatments, independent of non-earners’
preferences and gender.
In summary, we find that non-earners in
Discrimination destroy significantly more than
non-earners inCompetition. No difference occurs
for the destruction levels of non-earners between
the treatments with non-discriminatory payment
regimes (Random, Competition), which is in line
with the previous findings of the non-parametric
tests. Hence, we confirm Hypothesis 1b. Model 2
highlights that our findings hold irrespective
of the payment level of the matched earner.
Non-earners in Discrimination always destroy
significantly more than non-earners in Com-
petition who are matched with €5-earners.9
Non-earners in the Competition treatment who
are matched with €15 earners destroy moderately
more than non-earners who are matched with €5
earners. Again, we find no significant differences
between the behavior of non-earners in Random
and Competition. Generally, subjects with a
higher (lower) aversion towards disadvantageous
inequality destroy more (less). Moreover, sub-
jects with a higher (lower) aversion towards
advantageous inequality destroy less (more).
Finally, our robustness checks in model 3 and
Table S1 (Supporting information) confirm the
findings of model 2. The treatment effects are
independent of individual characteristics and
performance differences within the non-earner
group across treatments demonstrated by robust-
ness checks in model 3 and Table S1 (Supporting
information).
Result 1:
a. Non-earners destroy significantly more
than earners.
b. In Discrimination this effect is more pro-
nounced than in the control treatments, and it is
not driven by a selection bias.
c. Destruction levels of non-earners do
not differ between Competition and Random.
This highlights the importance of the non-
discriminatory nature of payment regimes.
Next, we analyze the mechanisms of
destructive behavior. In particular, we examine
9. A closer look reveals that there is no treatment effect
when comparing the data with the destruction levels of
non-earners in Competition who were matched with €15-
earners. Our analyses in Section B will show that this can
be explained by individual inequality aversion which only
plays an important role in the Competition treatment. That
is, inequality-averse non-earners who earned substantially
less than their matched (€15) earner destroy particularly high
amounts of vouchers.
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the impact of inequality aversion and test
Hypothesis 2. Furthermore, we will test Hypoth-
esis 3 and analyze if workers who believed that
they were discriminated by the payment regime,
that is, receiving a payment which is unjustified
in terms of perceived individual relative perfor-
mance, destroy more than workers who did not
hold this belief.
B. Mechanisms: Inequality Aversion
Individual levels of inequality aversion
may explain why workers destroy vouchers.
In all treatments, we keep the distribution of
payments constant. It is only the payment pro-
cedure that differs across treatments. To test
whether the treatment effect is driven by the
non-discriminatory payment regime alone and
not by a combination of inequality aversion and
the payment conditions (which may be more
amplified in the Discrimination treatment), we
focus on the explanatory power of inequality
aversion in the three treatments. If inequality
aversion can explain destructive behavior of
non-earners in our control treatments, but not
in the discriminatory treatment, we can rule out
inequality aversion as a major driver of destruc-
tive behavior in Discrimination. In this case,
workers’ perception of the payment procedure
per se and not the resulting inequality in pay-
ments must drive the higher level of destructive
behavior in Discrimination.
Non-earners always fall short of earners in
terms of total income including the payment in
the real-effort task and the value of vouchers
to keep. A reduction of the income disparity is
possible when non-earners burn more vouchers
than their counterparts.10 Figure 4 depicts non-
earners’ destruction levels conditional on their
aversion to disadvantageous inequality (alpha),
standard deviations in parentheses. For the analy-
sis, we condition subjects on the median alpha of
the whole data set (0.93). We distinguish between
non-earners with an above and a below or equal-
median alpha.
On average, non-earners with an above-
median alpha destroy more than non-earners
with a below- or equal-median alpha. As can
be seen in Figure 4, this relation holds in the
10. Note that when non-earners are matched with earners
€5, they could equalize incomes by destroying all of their
vouchers. However, equalizing incomes also requires that €5-
earners do not destroy more than one voucher from a matched
non-earner. It is never possible for non-earners to catch up to
€15-earners.
FIGURE 4
Destruction Levels of Non-earners Conditioned
on Aversion to Disadvantageous Inequality
(Standard Deviations in Parentheses)
treatments with a non-discriminatory payment
regime. That is, Spearman’s rank correlation
coefficient tests show a significant positive
correlation between non-earners’ alpha and
their destruction levels (Competition: 𝜌 = 0.281,
p = 0.053; Random: 𝜌 = 0.389, p = 0.016). In
both treatments, non-earners with an above-
median alpha destroy significantly more than
non-earners with a below-median alpha (both
Mann–Whitney tests, p< 0.055). By contrast,
under a discriminatory payment regime there
is no significant correlation between disadvan-
tageous inequality aversion and non-earners’
destruction levels (𝜌 = 0.160, p = 0.325) and
destruction levels do not differ between below
(above) median performance within the non-
earner group (Mann–Whitney test, p = 0.543).
Overall, Figure 4 emphasizes that other than in
the control treatments, destruction levels in Dis-
crimination are always high, independent of the
level of non-earners’ aversion towards disadvan-
tageous inequality aversion. This is confirmed by
Mann–Whitney tests showing that non-earners
with a below-median alpha destroy significantly
more in Discrimination than in Competition
(Mann–Whitney test, p = 0.079) and than in
Random (Mann–Whitney test, p = 0.059). We
conclude that inequality aversion only matters
in Competition and Random. When the payment
regime is discriminatory, other factors seem to
induce a generally high destructive behavior
which is not (unambiguously) affected by disad-
vantageous inequality aversion. Thus, unethical
behavior is not solely triggered by inequality
aversion when wage differentials are highly pro-
cedural unfair. Therefore, we only find support
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for Hypothesis 2 in Competition and Random but
not in Discrimination.
Result 2:
a. Non-earners’ inequality aversion explains
destruction levels in the Competition and Ran-
dom treatments.
b. Inequality aversion does not have explana-
tory power in the Discrimination treatment.
Next, we focus on perceived relative perfor-
mance as an alternative explanation for unethi-
cal behavior.
C. Mechanisms: Beliefs on Performance
Recall that subjects in the Discrimination
treatment were randomly assigned to the earner-
and the non-earner group and performance
between earners and non-earners does not sig-
nificantly differ on average in this treatment.
Thus, there are subjects in the Discrimination
treatment with an above-median performance
who ended up being a non-earner. The same
holds in the Random treatment. These “high
performers” would have qualified for a payment
in the Competition treatment that we categorize
as more procedurally fair since all subjects are
paid according to their relative performance. In
this section, we test Hypothesis 3 for non-earners
who believed that they achieved an above-
median performance in the Discrimination and
Random treatments. We analyze whether they
may be particularly fed up with these payment
regimes. Since workers do not know their real
performance, we focus on non-earners’ beliefs
of having deserved to become an earner by their
relative performance. We elicited these beliefs
in an incentivized way after they completed the
real-effort task and before they were informed
on the payments of the real-effort task.11
In the following, we compare non-earners
who held the belief that they belong to the
above-median performers with non-earners who
11. We implemented the incentives as follows. Subjects
had to categorize their performance level relative to all other
participants within the session. For this purpose, we formed
four equally-sized groups ascending with performance and
asked participants to choose one of the groups 1–4 (group
1 = best performance; group 2 = worst performance) they
think they belong to. They received €0.50, if they correctly
guessed their performance interval. In one session we had
20 participants which results in five groups of four. In this
case, we only categorize subjects who guessed that they
ranked in groups 1 and 2, as subjects who hold above-
median performance.
FIGURE 5
Destruction Levels of Non-earners Conditional
on Performance Beliefs and Treatments
(Standard Deviations in Parentheses)
believed that they belong to the below-median
performers. Figure 5 presents these data for the
three treatments.
In the Discrimination treatment workers’
antisocial behavior is almost independent of
their belief of becoming an earner. We find that
destruction levels are slightly higher for workers
who believed that they had an above-median
performance (1.90) as compared to workers who
did not hold this belief (1.55) (Mann–Whitney
test, p = 0.974). This difference is not statisti-
cally significant. Therefore, we reject Hypothesis
3. A similar pattern occurs in Random where
destruction levels do not differ between non-
earners who held a belief that they have a
below-median performance and non-earners
who believed that they have an above-median
performance (Mann–Whitney test, p = 0.985).
This could suggest that a payment regime lacking
merit payment makes all people equally fed up
independent of the discriminatory nature of the
payment regime. An alternative explanation is
that there is an interaction between subjects’
ability and antisocial behavior such that non-
earners with a high performance are less likely to
destroy vouchers. This could mitigate the level
of antisocial behavior relative to the non-earners
who achieved a low performance. However, our
robustness checks (model 3 of Table 2, and Table
S1, Supporting information) show that antisocial
behavior in Discrimination is not affected by
such an interaction effect.
Turning to Competition, we find that non-
earners who expected to deserve a payment
destroy a similar amount (1.75) as non-earners in
Discrimination (Mann–Whitney test, p = 0.838)
and an insignificantly higher amount as compared
to non-earners in Random (Mann–Whitney test,
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p = 0.109) who had similar payment expecta-
tions. Interestingly, non-earners who believed
that they had a below-median performance
destroy a significantly lower amount (0.79) than
non-earners who expected to deserve a payment
in Competition (Mann–Whitney test, p = 0.055).
Result 3: Non-earners generally destroy more in
theDiscrimination treatment independent of their
belief of becoming an earner.
We can summarize that the source of inequal-
ity, that is, the discriminatory nature of the
allocation procedure makes people behave more
unethically in general. Noteworthy, under our
discriminatory payment regime non-earners’
dissatisfaction seems to be independent of their
social preferences and a potential entitlement to
their remuneration.
D. Effects on Cooperation
Our main results demonstrate that discrimi-
nation leads to more unethical behavior com-
pared to Competition or Random. In this section,
we will test Hypothesis 4 and assess whether
discrimination and experienced antisocial behav-
ior affects cooperative behavior as well. Here,
we focus on the general sentiment of all sub-
jects (non-earners and earners) who experienced
a certain payment regime. Cooperative behav-
ior is measured by using a sequential prisoner’s
dilemma game which we played after subjects
made their decisions in the JoD game. At this
stage, subjects did not know whether other sub-
jects destroyed vouchers from them. The results
on cooperation might be interpreted as another
measure for social behavior. However, the mea-
sure is less hot-handed. Here, subjects’ beliefs
and expectations about the other person’s behav-
ior play a major role. Therefore, we may inter-
pret lower levels of first-mover cooperation as a
decline in the work climate in general. Figure 6
reports first-mover cooperation levels, standard
deviations in parentheses.
It can be seen that the average cooperation
rate is similar in the non-discriminatory payment
regimes, that is, 64% of subjects cooperate in
Competition and 63% of subjects cooperate in
Random. In contrast, in Discrimination, workers
show a lower degree of cooperation (51%).
The finding is supported by logit regressions
on first movers’ likelihood to cooperate in the
sequential prisoner’s dilemma (Table 3). The
regression table reports average marginal effects.
In model 1, we include treatment dummies
FIGURE 6
Share of Cooperating Subjects (in %) across
Treatments
(Discrimination, Random), a dummy (non-
earner) which indicates whether subjects are
non-earners, and a variable (vouchers removed)
that controls for the number of vouchers that
subjects destroyed from coworkers in the JoD
game. The latter controls whether subjects’
propensity to behave antisocially spills over
to cooperation behavior.
We also include subjects’ performance in
the real-effort task (Performance) and the
inequality-aversion parameters of the Fehr and
Schmidt (1999) model (Alpha, Beta). In model
2, we interact the non-earner dummy with the
treatment dummies. We omit the competition
treatment. In model 3, we include control vari-
ables on subjects’ gender, age, risk preferences,
and another dummy variable of whether they are
enrolled in an econ program.
Models 1–3 show that subjects cooperate sig-
nificantly less when they experienced a discrimi-
natory payment regime as compared to the Com-
petition treatment. This is demonstrated by the
significant coefficient ofDiscrimination. Model 3
highlights that the average probability of cooper-
ation is 21% lower for first movers in theDiscrim-
ination treatment as compared to Competition.
A Wald test shows that there is not a significant
difference between Discrimination and Random
(p> 0.391).
Generally, non-earners apparently cooperate
less which is represented by the negative and
significant coefficient of non-earner in models 2
and 3. However, models 2 and 3 show that
the interactions of non-earner and the treat-
ment dummies are insignificant. Thus, the
treatment effect we observe for subjects in the
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TABLE 3
Logit Regressions on Cooperation Levels of
First Movers in the Sequential Prisoner’s
Dilemma
Cooperation
(1) (2) (3)
Discrimination −0.125* −0.187* −0.215**
(0.071) (0.107) (0.106)
Random −0.012 −0.094 −0.121
(0.077) (0.119) (0.118)
Non-earner −0.097 −0.185* −0.214*
(0.063) (0.111) (0.111)
Vouchers removed −0.012 −0.011 −0.013
(0.017) (0.017) (0.017)
Discrimination× non-earner 0.117 0.148
(0.154) (0.153)
Random× non-earner 0.140 0.154
(0.157) (0.155)
Performance 0.001 0.000 0.000
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Alpha 0.018 0.021 0.017
(0.018) (0.018) (0.018)
Beta 0.232** 0.240** 0.256***
(0.093) (0.094) (0.093)
Controlsa No No Yes
Obs. 252 252 252
Notes: The regressions report average marginal effects.
Standard errors in parentheses. *p< 0.1; **p< 0.05;
***p< 0.01.
a Controls: gender, age, risk preferences and whether sub-
jects studied economics. The only significant control variable
is econ with a negative sign. That is, economist generally
cooperate less.
Discrimination treatment is not induced by
non-earners. A discriminatory payment regime
generally lowers cooperation of all payment
groups as compared to subjects who worked
under a non-discriminatory payment regime.
Moreover, vouchers removed is not significant,
that is, higher levels of antisocial behavior do
not translate to less cooperation in the sequential
prisoner’s dilemma. Subjects with an aversion
towards advantageous inequality cooperate sig-
nificantly more often, which is emphasized by
the significant positive coefficient of Beta. We
do not find that performance affects the results.
We also do not find any treatment differences
for second-mover cooperative behavior. The
cooperation rate of second-movers is 65% in
Discrimination, 66% in Competition, and 68% in
Random. Thus, we can conclude that first movers
decreased cooperation inDiscrimination because
they expected that second movers will be less
cooperative. However, they held a wrong belief
since trustworthiness seems not to be affected by
the procedural fairness of the payment regime.
Result 4: After experiencing a discriminatory
payment regime, workers show lower coopera-
tion levels compared to the non-discriminatory
payment regime Competition. There is a
similar level of trustworthiness across all three
treatments.
E. Postexperimental Questionnaire
After the experimental session, subjects
rated their fairness perception of the payment
procedure in an expost questionnaire. More-
over, we asked subjects for their motivations to
destroy.
Fairness Perception. To elicit fairness percep-
tions of payment regimes we asked participants:
“How fair did you perceive your payment of
Stage 2 (counting task)? Decide on a scale
from 1 to 10, 1 signifies very unfair, and 10
very fair. You can grade your answer with the
values in between.” We find that earners report
a higher degree of perceived fairness (Discrimi-
nation: 7.13; Competition: 7.54; Random: 6.97)
as compared to non-earners (Discrimination:
3.45; Competition: 4.96; Random: 3.74). The
Mann–Whitney tests of the reported levels
between earners and non-earners are highly sig-
nificant (p< 0.001) in all treatments. Focusing
on earners in Discrimination, we do not find
any treatment differences between Competition
(Mann–Whitney test, p = 0.393) and Random
(Mann–Whitney test, p = 0.863). Focusing on
non-earners enables us to compare the fairness
perceptions of subjects of the same income group
who experienced different degrees of procedu-
ral fairness. We find that non-earners report a
significantly lower perceived fairness inDiscrim-
ination than in Competition (Mann–Whitney
test, p = 0.002). This is in line with our previous
findings that a discriminatory payment scheme
leads to a generally higher degree of frustration
for non-earners than a competitive payment
scheme. Interestingly, in Random, non-earners’
perceived fairness is not significantly differ-
ent from Discrimination (Mann–Whitney test,
p = 0.517). An explanation for higher destruction
rates in Discrimination compared to Random
may be that workers under the random payment
regime know that higher payments cannot be
induced by higher performance in any way. Thus,
their payoff expectations may be lower compared
to Discrimination resulting in less frustration
when realizing that they did not receive a high
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payment. This suggests that in Discrimination
antisocial behavior may be driven by a combina-
tion of the perceived unfair payment regime and
the frustration when realizing that work effort
did not pay off.
Stated Reasons to Destroy. All participants were
asked about their reasons to destroy or not to
destroy. We predefined possible answers depen-
dent on the subject’s destruction decision. In
Table S3 (Supporting information), we present
descriptive results for non-earners’ reasons to
destroy. In total, 36% of non-earners inDiscrimi-
nation and 42% of non-earners in Random stated
that the unfairness of the payment regime was the
reason why they destroyed vouchers. In the com-
petitive environment, the majority of non-earners
(33%) justified their decision by referring to the
existence of the random destruction parameter.
Hence, those subjects argued that even if they had
not destroyed any vouchers, the computer might
destroy vouchers from the matched partner. This
behavior may be interpreted as “joy of destruc-
tion” in which frustration plays a less important
role (Abbink and Herrmann 2011; Abbink and
Sadrieh 2009).
IV. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we analyze the impact of
allocation procedures and procedural fairness
on workers’ unethical behavior. Specifically,
we investigate how a discriminatory payment
regime affects subsequent antisocial actions
towards bystanders. We find that, in general, a
substantial fraction of workers engage in anti-
social behavior independent of the treatment,
which is in line with other experiments in this
area (e.g., Abbink and Herrmann 2011; Abbink
and Sadrieh 2009). The novelty of our research
question is that we examine how perceived
unfair allocation procedures can spill over to
unethical conduct. We want to emphasize that
we do not focus on retribution attempts towards
the institution or managers introducing payment
unfairness. We also do not focus on retribution
attempts against sabotaging coworkers. Instead,
we designed our experiment in a way that a
payment regime of a “faceless” institution is
imposed on workers who can engage in anti-
social actions towards coworkers who are not
accountable for the (un)fair payment regime.
We find that a discriminatory payment pro-
cedure, characterized by unequal chances of
promotion, makes people more unethical. Par-
ticularly discriminated workers, who were not
given the chance of promotion, relieve their
resentment in destructive behavior that hurts
better-off coworkers. In the vein of Folger and
Konovsky (1989), people also cooperate less
when there is pronounced procedural unfairness.
Our results provide evidence that only the pay-
ment procedure itself triggers more antisocial
behavior. Hence, the results highlight the impor-
tance of procedural fairness when designing
institutional factors such as payment regimes to
maintain individual satisfaction and prosocial
behavior in general.
Remarkably, in our set-up, a competitive pay-
ment regime mitigates antisocial behavior—at
least compared with the other payment schemes
in our experiment. At first, this insight may
be surprising as these market structures
are often opposed to cooperative behavior
(Buser and Dreber 2015; Grosch, Ibanez, and
Viceisza 2017). Yet, our results highlight that
competitive market structures may work as a
transparent remuneration mechanism when all
workers have equal opportunities to be evaluated
on fair terms. However, if equal treatment cannot
be guaranteed, discriminated workers might
try to release their frustration at the workplace
inducing potential costs.
A closer look at the potential mechanism
reveals that under non-discriminatory payment
regimes (Competition, Random), antisocial
behavior can be partly predicted by indi-
vidual inequality aversion (e.g., Fehr 2018;
Zizzo 2003). More precisely, non-earners’
destruction levels positively depend on their
degree of disadvantageous inequality aversion
when everybody has equal opportunities to
receive a (high) bonus. In a regime where pay-
ments are discriminatory, however, inequality
aversion is not the driving factor. Our analysis
of perceived relative performance also shows
that non-earners who believed that they were
not paid performance-based do not destroy more
than non-earners who did not hold this belief,
neither in Discrimination nor in Random. This
highlights that workers under a discriminatory
payment regime, generally, behave more uneth-
ically independent of whether they believed that
they deserved a better payment or not. Our ques-
tionnaire revealed that in the treatments where
performance could matter for the payments
workers perceived the discriminatory payment
as significantly more unfair than the competi-
tive payment regime. These results suggest that
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perceived unfair payment regimes can evoke
feelings of indignation (Card and Dahl 2011)
overwriting actions based on (purely) inherent
(inequality) preferences when workers realize
that their effort did not pay off in these settings.
Although one may argue that our experi-
mental design is somewhat artificial, we believe
that it may resemble several procedures at the
workplace in which the exact reasons for the
decisions remain unclear. It is possible that
workers are frustrated about the payment proce-
dures in an institution but it is hard to retaliate
against a (responsible) superior or, depending
on the type of allocation procedure, against the
institution. However, a limitation of the study
might be that in some company settings employ-
ees may have ample opportunities to express
their dissatisfaction with the procedures. It has
been shown that workers respond to framing and
intentional wage discrimination in gift-exchange
games by retaliating against the employer (e.g.,
Charness, Frechette, and Kagel 2004; Charness
and Levine 2007; Gächter and Thöni 2010).
Therefore, we would expect that people would
behave much more antisocially when they have
the opportunity to retaliate against the “source”
of the unfair wage differential than in our set-up.
Since our experimental design only allowed
to punish a bystander, we cannot make any
predictions for potential retaliation actions the
employee might take instead if s/he has a choice.
If one is willing to transfer our results to (pub-
lic) institutions and society in general, we can
find several examples where procedural fairness
matters in real life. Hospitals, for instance, may
offer medical treatments partly based on people’s
willingness or ability to pay for it. This makes
the nature of procedure somehow arbitrary and
frustrating for patients who do not receive their
preferred treatment. Another example could be
the allocation of public funds. Here, the peo-
ple in charge may underlie specific biases such
as a sequential bias resulting in an unfair (unin-
tended) allocation procedure of funds. More-
over, in academia, institutions and appointment
committees may not always base their decisions
purely on academic skills and performance. In
summary, the procedural fairness of institutions
may be crucial for the level of ethical conduct and
ultimately the quality of relations and coopera-
tion within society.
Our study may spur further research on the
effects of discrimination and the determinants of
unethical conduct. Bracha, Gneezy, and Loewen-
stein (2015) found that giving workers a reason
for unequal payments makes them more accept-
ing of relatively low payment. This is in line with
our observation in the Competition treatment
in which subjects were informed that relative
performance determines payoffs. In Random,
subjects know that the outcome is purely based
on a random process and therefore performance
can never be the reason for the realized payment.
Leaving wiggle room about the reasons why
subjects may not be selected for promotion in a
discriminatory treatment could be another inter-
esting avenue to investigate. Certain groups of
people with a specific characteristic such as gen-
der, sexual orientation, physical attractiveness,
or ethnicity (Leibbrandt, Wang, and Foo 2017;
Price 2012; Ruffle and Shtudiner 2014), may
be subject to discrimination more often than
other groups in real life. In situations with
non-standardized procedures, they may have a
higher baseline probability to be discriminated
against. However, it is possible that these people
even overestimate their chances to become a
victim of discrimination (Glover, Pallais, and
Pariente 2017). Furthermore, we have found
that a discriminatory payment procedure leads
to similar overall performance as a competitive
payment procedure. Other studies have shown
that wage differentials arising from perceived
unfair procedures can result in less effort exerted
at the workplace (e.g., Cohn et al. 2014; Heinz
et al. Forthcoming; Johnson and Salmon 2016;
McGee andMcGee 2019). Maybe due to the one-
shot nature of our experiment, we did not observe
any effects on workers’ motivation. Long-term
consequences arising from discrimination on
people’s intrinsic motivation, satisfaction, and
trust levels may be detrimental for economic
outcomes and worthwhile to investigate in
future research.
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